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Research Article
Value Orientations and the Second Demographic Transition (SDT)






The core issue in this article is the empirical tracing of the connection between a variety
of value orientations and the life course choices concerning living arrangements and
family formation. The existence of such a connection is a crucial element in the so-
called theory of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT).
The underlying model is of a recursive nature and based on two effects: firstly,
values-based self-selection of individuals into alternative living arrangement or
household types, and secondly, event-based adaptation of values to the newly chosen
household situation. Any testing of such a recursive model requires the use of panel
data. Failing these, only “footprints” of the two effects can be derived and traced in
cross-sectional data. Here, use is made of the latest round of the European Values
Surveys of 1999-2000, mainly because no other source has such a large selection of
value items. The comparison involves two Iberian countries, three western European
ones, and two Scandinavian samples.
The profiles of the value orientations are based on 80 items which cover a variety
of dimensions (e.g. religiosity, ethics, civil morality, family values, social cohesion,
expressive values, gender role orientations, trust in institutions, protest proneness and
post-materialism, tolerance for minorities etc.). These are analysed according to eight
different household positions based on the transitions to independent living,
cohabitation and marriage, parenthood and union dissolution. Multiple Classification
Analysis (MCA) is used to control for confounding effects of other relevant covariates
(age, gender, education, economic activity and stratification, urbanity). Subsequently,
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Correspondence Analysis is used to picture the proximities between the 80 value items
and the eight household positions.
Very similar value profiles according to household position are found for the three
sets of countries, despite the fact that the onset of the SDT in Scandinavia precedes that
in the Iberian countries by roughly twenty years. Moreover, the profile similarity
remains intact when the comparison is extended to an extra group of seven formerly
communist countries in central and Eastern Europe. Such pattern robustness is
supportive of the contention that the ideational or “cultural” factor is indeed a non-
redundant and necessary (but not a sufficient) element in the explanation of the
demographic changes of the SDT. Moreover, the profile similarity also points in the
direction of the operation of comparable mechanisms of selection and adaptation in the
contrasting European settings.Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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1. Introduction
Starting in the 1960s, there was a drastic transformation in the pattern of household
formation and reproduction in North-Western Europe.  The age at first marriage rose
again after falling to an unprecedented low during the 1960s. Premarital and post-
marital cohabitation increased, and procreation in such informal unions soon followed.
Divorce rates continued to rise in tandem with high separation rates among cohabitants.
Also starting in the late 1960s was a pronounced postponement of fertility, which was
followed by only a partial catching up at later ages (Note 1). In the 1970s, total fertility
rates (TFRs) in western countries essentially reflected differential postponement; in the
1990s, national TFRs mainly capture differential degrees of catching up after age 30
(Note 2).
At first it was thought that the economic recession following the 1974 oil crisis
was responsible for later marriage and postponement of childbearing (Note 3), but there
were already some suspicions that the roots of the new forms of household formation
were to be found in the 1960s, and more particularly in the marked shift in values that
occurred during that decade. Demographic changes were linked to (i) the accentuation
of individual autonomy in ethical, moral and political spheres; (ii) to the concomitant
rejection of all forms of institutional controls and authority; and (iii) to the rise of
expressive values connected to the so-called “higher order needs” (Note 4) of self-
actualisation.  This connection between the demographic and value transformations
became an essential ingredient of “Europe’s second demographic transition” (SDT)
(Note 5).
Towards the end of the 1980s, several features of this “second transition” seemed
to stop at the Alps and Pyrenees. Italy, Portugal and Spain had started the postponement
phase with respect to marriage and fertility, but the other two features, i.e. cohabitation
and procreation outside wedlock, had either failed to gain ground (Italy) or were just
beginning to spread (Portugal, Spain).  Until 1990, earlier patterns of marriage and
fertility had also been maintained in central and Eastern Europe.  As yet there were no
clear signs of postponement or of the diffusion of premarital cohabitation.  It thus
seemed that the SDT was a northern and western European phenomenon, which had
crossed the oceans (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States), but not the old
European cultural and political divides.
After 1990 this picture changed rapidly. In the Iberian Peninsula, the proportions
of births outside marriage rose more rapidly, signalling that both cohabitation and
procreation within informal unions were spreading. In Central and Eastern Europe (but
not in the CIS countries), the postponement of marriage and childbearing started and
progressed to the point of causing a fall in national TFRs to levels below 1.5 childrenDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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and even 1.3. A new term was coined: “lowest-low fertility” (Note 6). A direct
connection was made between marriage and fertility postponement on the one hand and
the effects of the difficult economic transition on the other. In particular, these
demographic changes were directly linked to rising unemployment, a reduction in
activity rates especially for women, to the end of life-long employment guarantees, the
drop in real household incomes, the decline of state support for families and the
enhanced visibility of poverty (Note 7).
It became clear, however, that the economic crisis was not the sole explanation for
the demographic changes in Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, by the 1990s the
younger generations which were to marry and start childbearing, had different priorities
and aspirations compared with those of the older cohorts who had spent much of their
lives during the communist era (Note 8). As was shown in an earlier contribution, the
patterns of value differentiation between people with different types of living
arrangements strongly supported the “second demographic transition thesis” for a
number of Central and Eastern European states as well (Note 9).
The present paper redirects attention to the western European situation. Firstly, it
wishes to explore whether the historically leading countries in the SDT, i.e. the
Scandinavian ones, still exhibit the typical statistical associations between various value
orientations and the different types of household positions during the 1990s. After three
decades one could indeed expect that such associations are dampened or even
obliterated as a result of routinisation of new forms of demographic behaviour in these
early SDT-countries. Secondly, we wish to check whether similar associations are
equally emerging among southern European “newcomers“, and more specifically in the
Iberian Peninsula. As indicated, Portugal and Spain increasingly exhibit the
demographic SDT-characteristics since the middle of the 1980s. Thirdly, the latest
results for a few western European “classics” are added for comparison. Finally, the
update has become possible thanks to the 1999 round of the European Values Surveys
(EVS). However, this source is not without problems, as we shall show in the next
section.
2. The European Values Surveys of 1999
Since 1980 the European Values Surveys (EVS) have become a major source of
information on changing values and their covariates (Note 10). There have now been
three rounds of the EVS (1981, 1990, 1999) in a fairly large number of countries.
Attitude and value measurements cover a broad variety of domains: marriage and
family, gender, religion, civil morality and ethics, political preferences, trust inDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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institutions, the propensity to protest, “postmaterialism” (Note 11), social distance and
tolerance for minorities, qualities valued in socialisation and in work, world orientation,
economic ideology (free enterprise versus state intervention), community involvement
and organisation membership, etc.. Most of these topics are covered by multiple
questions or items, which improves the validity of their measurement. In the 1999
round, many countries also fine-tuned the household questions, inter alia, by inserting a
probe for earlier premarital cohabitation. As a consequence, a finer typology for living
arrangements could be constructed from this latest round of data.
The major drawback of the EVS has always been the use of small national sample
sizes. The EVS standard practice is that a sample of 1,000 respondents suffices to cover
the entire population, i.e. both sexes and all ages from 18 to 80. Only a few countries
have larger sample sizes (Note 12). Such small samples are generally inadequate for
crucial topics such as the study of the value orientations of the newly arriving cohorts of
young adults, or for addressing any questions pertaining to more narrow age groups or
subcategories.
The present study has also been hampered by these small national EVS samples,
and as a result it was necessary to pool information for countries. For the present
purpose, three pooled groups are formed:
• WEST-3: Belgium, France and Germany;
• IBERIA-2: Portugal and Spain;
• SCANDINAVIA-2: Sweden and Denmark.
As already mentioned, the 1999 EVS permits a more meaningful classification of
respondents according to household situation than was possible in the earlier EVS
rounds.  More specifically, use is made of the following eight categories:
• Respar: respondents currently residing in the parental household without a
partner or spouse. Most of them are never married or were never in a union, and
never left home either (86 per cent). The rest have returned to the parental
household after a different history;
• Single: Respondents who are not living with their parents, have never married
and are not currently in a partnership either. Some had an earlier relationship,
but none have children;
• Coh0: currently unmarried but cohabiting respondents without children,
irrespective of earlier histories;
• Coh+: currently cohabiting respondents with children, again irrespective of
earlier histories;
• Mar0: currently married respondents with a spouse present but without children;Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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• Mar+N: currently married respondents with a spouse and children, but who
never passed through premarital cohabitation (N = never cohabited);
• Mar+E: currently married with spouse and children, but who passed through
premarital cohabitation (E = ever cohabited);
• FmNu: formerly married or cohabiting respondents who are currently divorced
or separated, but not yet in a new union.  The majority of these respondents (80
per cent) have children and many women among them form a lone parent
household.
The sample sizes for the eight household types in each of the three groups of
countries are given in Table 2.1 (absolute numbers and percentage distribution). These
pertain to respondents aged 18 to 45. Despite the pooling of national samples, sample
sizes are still small for some household categories, and especially for respondents with
a current or earlier cohabitation experience in the Iberian Peninsula. This obviously
reflects their smaller prevalence in the population. Also, few respondents living alone
after separation or widowhood were found in Sweden and Denmark, which is indicative
of faster re-entry into consensual unions and of a higher non-response in this group.
But, for research relating household positions to value orientations these sample sizes
are adequate. Aside from the sample size problem, the eight household positions
defined above constitute a “maximal resolution” typology of household positions that
can be achieved with the EVS questions. In other words, more elaborate typologies that
would capture more detailed histories and paths of household position transitions
cannot be constructed. Regrettably this also caused a few very small but interesting
subgroups that do not fit in this typology to be dropped from the analysis (e.g. 10 lone
parents who left their own parental household but never married or cohabited).
Table 2.1: Sample sizes for household types in 3 country groups
(Abs. numbers + %), respondents aged 18-45.
Household
position
West-3 Iberia-2 Scandinavia-2 Total
Respar 287 (10.8) 322 (31.1) 45 (5.1) 654 (14.3)
Single 340 (12.8) 49 (4.7) 92 (10.4) 481 (10.5)
Coh0 346 (13.0) 87 (8.4) 189 (21.3) 622 (13.6)
Coh+ 198 (7.5) 30 (2.9) 119 (13.4) 347 (7.6)
Mar0 126 (4.8) 76 (7.4) 43 (4.8) 245 (5.4)
Mar+N 649 (24.5) 417 (40.3) 197 (22.2) 1263 (27.6)
Mar+E 511 (19.3) 18 (1.7) 171 (19.3) 700 (15.3)
FmNu 195 (7.4) 35 (3.4) 32 (3.6) 262 (5.7)
Total 2652 (100) 1034 (100) 888 (100) 4574 (100)Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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3. Which values matter?
The initial article on “the second demographic transition” (Note 13) posited that the
new living arrangements, and cohabitation in particular, were the expression of secular
and anti-authoritarian sentiments of better educated young cohorts with an egalitarian
world view and greater emphasis on “higher order needs” (i.e. self-actualisation,
expressive values, recognition). This reflected the picture of cohabitants in the Low
Countries during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, Belgium and the
Netherlands had a plethora of political parties that represented the entire spectrum from
“old values” to “new values” (Note 14), and voting behaviour according to living
arrangements provided the initial empirical check. At the same time the correlates of
Inglehart’s “post-materialist” orientation were high on the research agenda of political
scientists, and both the European Union Eurobarometer Surveys and the first EVS of
1981 provided data for more detailed empirical verification in several West European
countries. Also in the United States statistical associations between value orientations
and living arrangements were drawing attention. Moreover, the United States
demographers and sociologists had moved on to panel studies in which specific value
orientations were recorded at each wave in tandem with the recording of vital events
occurring in the intervals between successive waves (Note 15). As a result, American
scholars were able to verify whether or not specific value orientations had predictive
power with respect to later household choices, and furthermore, they were able to assess
to what extent earlier transitions in household position had led to the accentuation or
the adjustment of previously held values and attitudes. In other words, a recursive
model emerged with (i) values-based selection into alternative living arrangements;
and (ii) event-based value adaptation. This feedback model of selection and adaptation
provides the dynamics of the process, whereas the cross-sectional correlation between
values and household positions are merely footprints of this recursive mechanism
(Note 16).
As indicated above, the initial set of values that were thought to determine the
selection among alternative pathways of household formation mainly dealt with the
following dimensions in the west:
• Secularisation, or the reduction in religious practice, the abandonment of
traditional religious beliefs (heaven, sin, etc.) and a decline in individual
sentiments of religiosity (prayer, meditation, etc.);
• The “new political left”, with indicators pertaining to Inglehart’s
“postmaterialism”, voting for Green parties or left-wing liberals, the propensity
to protest, distrust in institutions, and anti-authoritarianism more generally;Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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• Egalitarianism, with an emphasis on gender equality, tolerance for minorities,
rejection of social class distinctions, and a preoccupation with North-South
equity associated with “world citizenship”;
• Unconventional civil morality and ethics, with greater tolerance for forms of
uncivil conduct (e.g. joyriding, drugs, tax evasion) as well as for interference in
matters of life and death (euthanasia, abortion, suicide);
• Accentuation of expressive values, showing an enhanced preoccupation with
individuality and self-fulfillment. Typical indicators are the ranking of the traits
of “imagination” and “independence” above all other qualities in the education
of children, or the preference for a job’s intrinsic qualities (challenging,
interesting, permitting social contact and initiative) rather than its material
advantages (pay, vacations, promotion);
• Companionship and unconventional marital ethics, stressing the quality of a
relationship (communication, tolerance and understanding, happy sexual
relationship) over the conventional and institutional foundations of marriage and
parenthood, and the toleration of deviations from strict marital morality
(adultery, casual sex, etc.).
During the 1990s, aspects related to social cohesion and social capital were added
to the list. There was a suspicion that traditional families had maintained stronger
community ties and a higher degree of involvement in various types of local
associations, whereas others had relinquished such links in favour of social networks
based on personal friendships. These connections have not been adequately researched
so far (Note 17), but in this article membership of associations and voluntary work are
included as extra items.
At this point it should be stressed that value orientations are not the only influences
that are important.  Other factors matter and empirical research has found a role for:
Family antecedents: the experience of parental divorce, and/or of family
reconstruction after a parental divorce, frequently lead to earlier home leaving, single
living, premarital cohabitation and even lone parenthood (Note 18);
Regional historical contexts: in several European countries, cohabitation and
procreation within cohabitation have increased much faster in regions (often rural ones)
with a much longer history of tolerance for such forms of family formation (e.g.
northern Scandinavia, Austrian alpine regions) (Note 19). In other countries, the current
emergence of new forms of household formation displays a strong correlation with the
regional pattern of the “first demographic transition”, i.e. with the onset of fertility
control and the weakening of the late Malthusian marriage pattern during the nineteenth
century (e.g. Belgium, France, Switzerland) (Note 20);Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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Diffusion mechanisms: with the passing of time new forms of behaviour gain
acceptability and legitimation, even to the point where they are accommodated by the
legal system. Increased legitimation is both the motor and the outcome of social
diffusion from an “innovative core” to other population segments;
Economic differentiation: new living arrangements may accommodate different
economic aspirations and situations.  For example, cohabitation may suit the motivation
of women to maintain their economic independence, as postulated in neo-classical
economic theory. Alternatively, it may be the expression of economic uncertainty, as
proposed by Easterlin’s relative deprivation theory (Note 21). In the former case,
cohabitation is likely to be found among better-educated women with careers, whereas
in the latter case cohabitation would be a dominant trait for lower social strata with less
income security. Moreover, cohabitation may be an interim phase that is a correlate of
the overall destandardization of the life course, including the destandardization of job
and career paths;
Policy effects, labour market characteristics and housing conditions: earlier home
leaving, single living and premarital cohabitation in the west are more typical of
countries with income support policies for young adults in the form of scholarships,
cheap student accommodation and transport subsidies (Note 22). Also the existence of
flexible labour markets with an ample supply of part-time jobs contributes to earlier
economic independence for younger adults. At the other end of the spectrum, prolonged
residence in the parental home is more typical of countries without such policies and/or
with expensive housing (Note 23).
To sum up, the shift towards “unconventional” values, often occurring via a
succession of generations, is by no means the only factor that has shaped the “second
demographic transition” in the west, but it has been a non-redundant factor in
sustaining a long-term demographic trend through periods of slower and faster
economic growth alike.
4. The footprints of selection and adaptation: what to expect?
In this section there is an analysis of the expected effects of values as they influence
choice of path in family formation, and of the ways in which values are reinforced or
adapted following such life course events. The overall picture of expectations is
summarised in Chart 4.1. First, on the vertical axis there is a variation between two
poles. One pole brings together the values that are non-conformist and more libertarian.
These are characterised by expressive values accentuating personality and self-
actualisation in non-material domains, by the stress on individual autonomy withDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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respect to all choices (morality and ethics included) and, correspondingly, by a rejection
of institutional authority. This pole is also a secular one, with tolerance for all types of
minorities, but also with a low identification or involvement in local community affairs.
The opposite pole is obviously characterised by high conformity and respect for
tradition, higher religiosity, respect for ethical and moral values that uphold social
cohesion and respect for authority coupled with a greater trust in institutions.
The starting position in Chart 4.1 is the respondent’s residence in the parental
household (Respar). At that point the “formative years”, or the late adolescent period of
value formation, are nearing their completion, and individuals have been subject to the
influence of parents, schools and peers. The influence of the latter is often in the
opposite direction from that of the other two, and may rise over time (Note 24). Also, as
already indicated, problems in the parental household (discord, separation, divorce)
have a major influence on both children’s values and options chosen in their life course.
It may therefore be expected that the position of young adults is already shifting toward
the non-conformist pole prior to leaving home.
Chart 4.1: Flow chart of life-course development and hypothesised changes in value
orientations stemming from selection-adaptation mechanism
Non-conformism = secular, stress individual autonomy, weaker
civil morality, expressive values, distrust institutions, protest
prone, tolerant minorities, world orientation, « postmaterialist ».
Conformism = religious, respect for authority, trust institutions,
conservative morality, lower tolerance minorities, local or











Respar = resident with parents ;
Single  = never married and not in a union ;
Coh0   = cohabiting and no children ;
Mar0   = married and no children ;
Coh+ = cohabiting with children ;
Mar+E= married with children and ever cohabited ;
Mar+N= married with children and never cohabited ;
FmNu = formerly married or in union, not yet in new union.Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
-- Contemporary Research on European Fertility: Perspectives and Developments --
http://www.demographic-research.org 55
During the next steps in the unfolding of the life course, it is expected that leaving
home in favour of living alone is predicated on the dominance of the non-conformist set
of values, whereas leaving home to get directly married reflects a choice based on
conventional values (Note 25). At the same time, these two options reinforce the values
that were responsible for the choice in the first place (Note 26). Hence, the position of
“single” tends toward the non-conformist pole in Chart 4.1, whereas “married without
children” (Mar0) is toward the conformist end.
“Singles” face the option of moving into cohabitation (Coh0) or of marrying
(Mar0). The former reinforces non-conformist values (Note 27). Partners are likely to
be chosen for their preference for unconventional values that underpin the choice in
favour of cohabitation. The mutually reinforcing orientations of such partners may then
enhance the consistency of various values sets more generally, so that childless
cohabitants (Coh0) can be expected to score highest and most consistently on the value
orientations associated with pole 1. By contrast, singles who move into marriage may
do so because of a higher respect for traditional institutions, out of respect for parental
preferences, or because they choose a partner with more conventional attitudes. Once
the institution of marriage is accepted, the consistency of values is again reinforced, and
a move in the opposite direction, i.e. towards pole 2, can be expected. A similar process
would apply to cohabitants that marry prior to parenthood. For them, the reorientation
of values associated with a transition to marriage could be quite substantial given that
they come from a strongly non-conventional position. However, it is possible that the
earlier convictions are not obliterated altogether, and that the experience of cohabitation
leaves a durable imprint.
The adjustment effects of parenthood are expected to be even stronger than those
of marriage. In fact, value shifts in the conformist direction already occur in
anticipation of parenthood (Note 28), the transition from cohabitation to marriage often
being made in anticipation of the arrival of the first child. Parenthood corresponds with
a firm commitment to both partner and child, closes “open futures”, and redirects
attention to the well-being of the next generation. Moral, civil and ethical values are
reaffirmed, and social networks associated with children are activated. Tolerance for
deviance diminishes, authority regains prominence, and self-actualisation takes second
place. Priorities are centred on the “priceless child”, and preoccupations shift in favour
of those upholding greater social cohesion. In Chart 4.1, all positions with children are
therefore located further toward the conformist pole. Nevertheless, it is hypothesised
that the earlier experience of cohabitation acts as a brake on this readjustment. The
position of Mar+E (= ever cohabited) therefore remains above that of Mar+N (= never
cohabited) on Chart 4.1.
Finally, a separation or divorce which has not yet been followed by a new
partnership (FmNu) causes a complete overhaul of the value structure.  New doubtsDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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emerge with respect to religion, traditional family values and trust in institutions. The
individual is also more likely to become more self-focused, and hence there is a new
preoccupation with the expressive values and with individual autonomy. It is therefore
hypothesised that the FmNu position shifts toward the non-conformist pole.
The household positions in Chart 4.1 are incomplete, and so are the types of
transition. However, they capture the dominant streams through the life course.
Moreover, the EVS only captures sections of the life course, and the sample sizes are
too small to separate certain categories into more meaningful ones. For instance, the
category Mar0, i.e. married without children, is too small to disaggregate into those
who “ever” and “never cohabited”. This highlights once more the need for larger
samples, and it shows the usefulness of “ever” questions probing for the occurrence of
earlier events or life markers.
The overall outcome of this section is that there should be an ordering of
individual household positions along the vertical axis of Chart 4.1, i.e. roughly from
“traditional” to “non-conformist”. In this ordering, cohabitants without children should
score highest on non-conformism, followed by singles and formerly married. Residents
in parental households should come next. More towards the opposite pole are married
persons without children, cohabiting parents and married parents who had previously
cohabited. The most conservative values should be found among married parents who
never cohabited. It should also be noted that these expectations about the “footprints” of
the recursive life cycle model were formulated in tempore non suspecto, i.e. well before
the present EVS survey results were available (Note 29).
5. Measurement and profiles: do we find the footprints of selection
and adaptation?
In this section the use of 80 specified value items is proposed, and these are analysed
for respondents aged 18 to 45. The selected values were common to all the country-
specific questionnaires of the 1999 EVS. The item profiles according to the household
position of respondents are checked to see whether the expectations just formulated are
emerging in all three-pooled country data sets. Similarity would indicate that the
selection and adjustment mechanisms that connect value orientations and life course
choices are indeed still operating more or less universally. On the other hand
comparison between the northern, southern and western European cases, which started
their transitions at very different points in time, may shed light on the staging of the
process. Looking at the second demographic transition as a diffusion process, it will be
interesting to see whether the Scandinavian countries, that occupied an advancedDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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position in the transition process, still exhibit the same value profiles in relationship to
household positions as the Iberian countries.
Firstly, the selection of 80 items was made on the basis of the individual country
data sets.  In this exploratory analysis use was made of Multiple Classification Analyses
(MCA) of over 150 items. For each item the covariates were a household position and
country-group combination variable (8 x 3 = 24 categories), age and age squared
(continuous), education level (4 categories), profession (9 categories, including
“unemployed”, “housewives” and “students”), gender, and urbanisation (2 categories).
The selection of the final 80 items was based on: (i) the topic, i.e. making sure that the
items covered all major domains or subjects, and (ii) the strength of their association
with household positions, i.e. the least discriminating items were left out (Note 30). A
set of 80 items is still very large, but maintaining multiple items per subject increases
measurement validity. The 80 items are listed in Table 5.1. All items are coded as
dummy variables, with the value of unity always being assigned to the non-conformist
or unconventional opinion.  Such a uniform coding direction facilitates the subsequent
inspection of value profiles across covariates and countries.
The list in Table 5.1 contains nine major subjects. The largest number of items
(15) pertains to attitudes related to marriage as an institution, to the qualities needed for
the success of a marriage, to the meaning of parenthood and parent-child duties, and to
the degree of permissiveness with respect to sexual freedom, divorce and abortion.
Secularism is represented by 9 items indicating a loss of traditional religious beliefs, a
low level of individual religious sentiment, and distrust in the churches as institutions.
The civil morality set with 12 items captures permissiveness with respect to different
forms of deviant behaviour, but also the ethical acceptability of forms of interference in
matters of life and death. The political set contains 11 items dealing with distrust of
institutions, protest proneness, Inglehart’s post-materialism index and the rejection of
authority more generally. The social distance or tolerance set is made up of 8 items that
indicate the type of persons that are either tolerated as neighbours or considered as
undesirable. The expressive values are spread over the socialisation and work quality
sets. The former 7 items show the preference for developing imagination and
independence in education rather than conformity and respect for others. The latter
(8 items) indicate a similar preference for intrinsic work qualities over material rewards
or status. The identification set (6 items) distinguishes a global or larger orientation
rather than a local identification or national pride, but with distrust in established
international organisations. The last set of 4 items indicates a retreat from social and
political life, and reveals the absence of any memberships or voluntary work, a distrust
of people in general and a lack of any interest in politics.  In all further analyses these
80 values will be used without any prior data reduction, such as factor analysis. Hence,
no particular structure will be imposed prior to further statistical work.Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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At this point the value profiles according to household position can be established.
It will be recalled that (i) all items are coded in the unconventional or non-conformist
direction; and (ii)  that controls are present for other covariates (i.e. gender, age,
education, profession and urbanity). The data set now takes the form of net deviations
from the item mean associated with each of the eight household positions over three
country groups. Such net deviations are available for each of the 80 items. A positive
value of a net deviation from the item mean indicates that a particular household
position has a more non-conformist attitude than average for the item concerned.
Hence, a simple tally of the number of positive deviations for each household position
is already highly revealing of the overall profile.
The results of such a tally are displayed in Table 5.2 and Chart 5.1 for each of the
three groups of countries. The multiple classification analyses that produced these
results were performed for each country group separately, so that individuals in a
particular household position are being compared to all others within the same group of
countries, and for all 80 items. With the “neutral line” set at 40 net positive deviations
out of the possible 80, young Scandinavian residents in the parental household
(Respar), for instance, score remarkably low on non-conformism (only 29 net positive
deviations from the means of 80 items, or a deficit of 29 - 40 = -11) when compared to
Scandinavians in the other household positions. Such a profile is not found in Iberia-2
or West-3: residents in the parental household in these regions already exhibit a high
non-conformist score (52 and 63 respectively) when compared to the others in the same
country group. This could mean that those in the “Respar” category in Scandinavia are
disproportionately made up of late home leavers selected for greater conformity.
However, as one progresses to that living alone (Single) and further to childless
cohabitants (Coh0), the differences between the three regions first shrink and then
disappear altogether. As predicted in Section 4, childless cohabitants score consistently
highest on non-conformism of all household positions considered, and this holds again
in all three regions studied here. Hence, even in Sweden and Denmark in 1999, the
classic non-conformist profile for childless cohabitants is just as clear a mark of
distinction as in the other regions, despite the very early onset of the SDT in these
countries, and despite their routinisation of single living and cohabitation as well.
The rest of the findings plotted in Chart 5.1 are equally in line with the “footprints”
predictions of Section 4. Moves into marriage and/or into parenthood are all associated
with value readjustments and with reduced non-conformism. In all three regions,
cohabitants with children (Coh+) still have tallies above 40 net positive deviations
(Iberia-2: 45; Scandinavia-2: 49; West-3: 47), but these scores are already well below
those for childless cohabitants (63 or 64). This is suggestive of the fact that parenthoodDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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Table 5.1: European Values Surveys, 1999: overview of 80 values used in the
current analysis
Topics and corresponding items Item description
Marriage and family: A1-A15
Marriage is an outdated institution (A1); children not necessary for life fulfilment (A2); parents
should not sacrifice themselves for children (A3); acceptable: casual sex (A4), adultery
(A5), divorce (A6), abortion (A7); important for marriage: tolerance and understanding
(A8), sharing chores (A9), talking (A10), time together (A11), happy sexual relations (A12);
not very important for the success of marriage: faithfulness (A13), children (A14); single
motherhood acceptable (A15).
Religion: A16-A24 Not believing in: god (A16), sin (A17), hell (A18), heaven (A19); no comfort from religion
(A20); no moments of prayer or meditation (A21); god not at all important in life (A22);
distrust church (A23); religious faith not mentioned as socialisation trait (A24).
Civil morality: A25-A36 Acceptable: soft drugs (A25), homosexuality (A26), joyriding (A27), suicide (A28),
euthanasia (A29), speeding (A30), drunk driving (A31), accepting bribes (A32), tax
cheating (A33), lying (A34), tax evasion by paying cash (A35), claiming unentitled state
benefits (A36).
Politics: B1-B11
Distrust in institutions: education system (B1), army (B2), police (B3), justice system (B4),
civil service (B5); participated or willing to participate in: unofficial strikes (B6), attend
unlawful demonstrations (B7), join boycotts  (B8), occupy buildings (B9); no more respect
for authority (B10); post-materialist (B11).
Identification: B12-B17 Identification with “Europe and world” (B12), not with “own village or town” (B13), not very
or quite proud of own nationality (B14); no priority for national workers (B15); no trust in
European Union (B16) or United Nations (B17).
Retreat: B18-B21 Not a member of any voluntary organisation (B18); no voluntary work (B19); people
cannot be trusted (B20); never discuss politics (B21).
Socialisation: C1-C7
Not mentioned as desirable traits in educating children: hard work (C1), obedience (C2),
good manners (C3), unselfishness (C4), tolerance and respect (C5); stressed as
desirable: independence (C6), imagination (C7).
Work qualities: C8-C15 Not mentioned as desirable job aspects: good hours (C8), promotion (C9); stressed as
desirable: respected job (C10), responsible job (C11), meeting people (C12), useful for
society (C13), interesting work (C14), enabling initiative (C15).
Social distance: C16-C23 Not wanted as neighbours: large families (C16), right-wing people (C17); no objection to
having as neighbours: aids patients (C18), unstable people (C19), those with criminal
record (C20), drug addicts (C21), homosexuals (C22), immigrants (C23).
Note:  All items are presented from a “non-conformist” perspective.Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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without prior marriage in all three regions is still based on a selection for higher non-
conformism in a wide array of value orientations, but that parenthood itself brings a
readjustment of these values in the opposite direction for persistent cohabitants as well.
A move into marriage prior to parenthood (Mar0), irrespective of the previous
household position, is equally associated in all three regions with lower scores on non-
conformism. However, this is most pronounced for West-3 and least for Scandinavia-2.
In fact, the Swedish and Danish married couples without children still have a slight
excess on net positive deviations (44 or +4), whereas in the other country groups,
childless married persons have a clear deficit (-5 in Iberia-2 and already -11 in West-3).
Again in line with the “footprints” prediction is that the lowest scores of overall
non-conformity are found for the currently married respondents with children and who
never cohabited (Mar+N). The differences for this category between the three regions
are not large, and in this respect the Scandinavian profile is again not noticeably
different from the western European or the Iberian ones.
Chart 5.1:  Number of positive net deviations (= non-conformist) for 80 items
according to household position; 1999 EVS results for three groups of
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Table 5.2:  Number of positive net deviations (= in non-conformist direction) for 80
value items according to household position; 1999 EVS results for three
groups of European countries after controls for other covariates.
Household position
Respar Single Coh0 Coh+ Mar0 Mar+N Mar+E FmNu
Scandinavia-2 29 44 63 49 44 22 35 34
West-3 63 61 63 47 29 14 29 57
Iberia-2 52 54 64 45 35 16 29 46
Note: the net deviations from the 80 item means are produced by MCAs performed for each country group separately and controlling
for gender, age, age squared, education, profession and urbanity. The maximum overall non-conformist score is 80.
Equally predicted in Section 4 was that the earlier experience of cohabitation
would have a more lasting impact. This can be checked here by comparing the results
for currently married respondents with children who ever cohabited and who never
cohabited respectively (Mar+E versus Mar+N). In the 1999 EVS and in all three
regions, married parents who did cohabit before have indeed a higher overall non-
conformism tally than those who did not cohabit. The gap is not small either, and
reaches 13 to 15 net positive deviations more for the ever-cohabiting groups in the three
regions.
Finally, the predicted upsurge of non-conformism associated with divorce or
partner separation is found in the 1999 EVS, but only for West-3 and Iberia-2. This
effect is much weaker in the two Scandinavian countries, and the FmNu group
maintains a fairly average position in this region. Only for this particular group would
the routinisation argument hold: higher divorce rates for a much longer time in
Scandinavian countries would lead to less values-based selectivity and weaker value
readjustment following a partner separation.
To sum up, the 1999 EVS results reaffirm that there is a persistent statistical
association between current household position and earlier cohabitation on the one hand
and non-conformism with respect to a wide array of value orientations on the other
hand. We also found very similar value profiles according to household position on the
basis of the 1999 EVS data for a set of Central and Eastern European countries.
Obviously, the magnitudes of the selection effects and of the adjustment effects vary
between European regions and societies, but the “footprints” outcomes are nevertheless
strikingly similar. In the comparison presented here, including the precursor countries
in the SDT (Sweden, Denmark) and newcomers (Spain, Portugal), there are noDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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fundamental distinctions: childless cohabitants stand out as the most non-conformist in
all three regions, moves into marriage and parenthood are typically associated with
value readjustments in the conformist direction, and the earlier cohabitation experience
has again a lasting impact even when all have moved into marriage and parenthood.
The pooled Scandinavian group only distinguishes itself from the others on the basis of
very low non-conformism for residents in the parental home (“left over” effect?) and no
major upsurge in non-conformism for the newly separated or divorced (routinisation
effect?).
6. Finer distinctions
So far the analysis has relied on simple tallies of net positive deviations generated by
Multiple Classification Analyses (MCA). In what follows, the item-by-item analysis is
extended by using the net positive deviations as inputs into a Correspondence Analysis
(Note 31). The aim is to bring out the proximities of value items and household
positions by trying to project them on a plane. Since proximities rely on distances,
which obviously cannot be negative, the net deviations generated by the MCA are
converted into rankings (Note 32). Hence, the input is now the ranking of a household
position (from 1 to 8) within each country group on each of the 80 items, a rank of 1
indicating that a particular household position has the highest positive net deviation for
a particular item in the country group. It is recalled that the net deviations, and hence
also the rankings, are measured after controls for gender, age, education, profession and
urbanisation.
With 80 items and 3 x 8 household positions, the projection of proximities yields a
plot with 104 dots. Since all of these would need to be identified with labels, such
“busy” plots are not easy to read. To overcome this drawback, new figures were
prepared using the following procedure:
• The 3 x 8 household positions are plotted on their exact location in the plane and
are labelled, but the items remain in the chart as unlabeled dots, grouped
according to their own proximities. The group is then represented by a segment
of the plane spreading outwards from the origin;
• It turned out that 6 groups of items, and hence 6 segments, could give an
adequate description of the item plots;
• It is helpful to add the information from the previous section, and to indicate to
what extent each household position contributes to the overall non-conformity
score from 0 to 80.  We have therefore tilted the projection plane, so that a thirdDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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dimension can be used to indicate the overall non-conformity score of each
household position;
• The tilted projection plane is located at a non-conformity level of 40. The
vertical arrows for each household position then indicate the number of items in
the non-conventional direction above (red arrows) or below (blue arrows) the
neutral mark of 40 for that household position.
The resulting three-dimensional figures now contain a large amount of
information. If a household type has an overall non-conformity score well in excess of
40 and is found near the edge of the plane, then it draws disproportionately on those
non-conformity items that are located in its own segment. In other words, these are the
items for which the household position has produced the higher rankings with respect to
the net deviations. Conversely, if the household type has a low overall non-conformity
score well below 40, it would still have higher rankings on nearby items in its own
segment. Household positions that are located closely to the origin have higher rankings
for all items, and not mainly for a particular group identified by a segment of the
projection plane. When this is coupled with a high overall non-conformity score, this
indicates that the household position produced high rankings for a great variety of
items, and if such a position near the origin is coupled with a low overall score, then it
draws its small set of the higher rankings from all sorts of items as well. Finally,
household types that are located at the opposite end of certain segments draw nothing or
almost nothing from the items associated with these segments (Note 33).
We shall now turn to the results of the Correspondence Analyses. Firstly, this
technique produces a unique plot of the 80 value-items for the three regions combined.
In this way, the region-specific properties with respect to the preferences of the various
household types can be compared in a later section. The value-items themselves are
obviously not scattered randomly on the projection plane, but clustered according to
their proximities to household types, and hence to some degree grouped according to
common topic or meaning. Chart 6.1 provides a representation of the location of the
various “clusters” of value items together with labels and the borders of the six
segments (see also below). As already indicated, we have identified six segments in
Charts 6.1 through 6.4. Obviously, we could have shifted the boundaries of the
segments or altered their number, and evidently, the present solution is largely arbitrary.
However, as also shown in Table 6.1, this solution has some direct meaning when
judged on the basis of the specific clustering of items. At any rate, this segmentation is
not a goal in its own right (as the identification of orthogonal factors would be in factor
analysis, for instance), but mainly a device that will facilitate the main task, i.e. the
country groups comparison of household “preferences” concerning these 80 value-
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A brief discussion of the content of the six segments may now be helpful, and
Table 6.1 has been set up for this purpose. The codes obviously refer to the item codes
introduced in Table 5.1.
Segment I contains a dominant set of items that are indicative of “core” secularisation
or atheism. These items are the expression of the rejection of basic elements of
religion, such as the belief in God and sin, or the importance of God in life. The
items also point at the absence of religious sentiments (A16, A17, A20, A22). To
this, a second set can be added with items that are related to protest-proneness
and activism (B3, B6, B9). Segment I also contains more isolated items that
often belong to a cluster located in an adjacent segment, such as the items
pertaining to a weaker family orientation (A3, A6), more libertarian civil
morality (A26, A27), or a more cosmopolitan outlook (B12, B14).
Segment II contains especially items of non-conformism in matters related to marriage
and the family (A1, A4, A5, A7, A13, and A15). There is also a rejection of
more “marginal” aspects of religion (e.g. belief in heaven and hell) (A18, A19)
and distrust in the church as an institution (A23).
Segment III is more heterogeneous and contains groups of items dealing with more
“youthful” forms of libertarian civil morality and distrust in institutions (A25,
A28, A31, B1, B5, B17). This is linked to a lack of interest in children (A14,
C16). Also indicators of low social involvement (B19, B21) belong to segment
III.
Segment IV corresponds to a very pronounced orientation toward the expressive work
values, and hence to self-actualisation in the work sphere (C8, C9, C13, C14 and
C15). This is matched by a high tolerance for deviant groups or minorities (C21,
C22, and C23). More isolated items in segment IV deal with weaker civil
morality, low community involvement or lack of national pride (A30, A32, B18,
B13).
Segment V mainly contains items stressing companionship in marriage (A10, A11) and
social status aspects of work (C10, C11). But this is accompanied by a higher
degree of distrust in other people in general and in the justice system (B2, B4
and B20).
Segment VI contains the largest number of items, and these essentially belong to four
subcategories. Firstly, there are several items indicative of a preference for a
more egalitarian partnership (important: tolerance and understanding, sharing
chores, happy sexual relationship – A2, A8, A9 and A12). Secondly, there is a
large cluster of items related to post-materialism and an anti-authoritarian
outlook in general (B7, B8, B10, B11, C2). Thirdly, this orientation is equally
emerging in the accentuation of the expressive socialisation values ofDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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“independence and imagination” (C6, C7) and in the rejection of typically
conformist ones (C2, C4). Fourthly, there is also a set of items indicative of a
greater acceptability of more “adult” forms of civil morality deviance, such as
tax evasion, tax cheating and social security fraud (B7, B8, B10 and B11).
However, this set of items is located closer to the origin, and is therefore more
common to all respondents. Finally, segment VI also contains a few borderline
items that are typical of the adjacent segments: they are related to secularism
(A21, A24) and tolerance for deviant groups (C19, C20). With the exception of
the civil morality set, many items in segment VI are related to a preference for
equity in social relations and an aversion for authority.
Table 6.1:  Location of 80 value items in the six segments of charts 6.1. through 6.4.
Corresponding value items
Segment I A3, A6, A16, A17, A20, A22, A26, A27,
B3, B6, B9, B12, B14 (13 items)
Segment II A1, A4, A5, A7, A13, A15, A18, A19, A23 (9 items)
Segment III A14, A25, A28 , A31,
B1, B5, B17, B19, B21,
C3, C16, C18 (12 items)
Segment IV A30, A32,
B13, B18,
C5, C8, C9, C13, C14, C15, C21, C22, C23 (13 items)
Segment V A10, A11, A34,
B2, B4, B20,
C1, C10, C11, C17 (10 items)
Segment VI A2, A8, A9, A12, A21, A24, A29, A33, A35, A36,
B7, B8, B10, B11, B15, B16,
C2, C4, C6, C7, C12, C19, C20 (23 items)
Note: The codes above are those of Table 5.1.Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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Chart 6.1:  Location of major “clusters” of non-conformist value items on the
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Chart 6.2:  Correspondence between household positions and 80 non-conformist
value items, EVS 1999, results for Scandinavia-2 (pooled samples)
I: Atheist and secular, activist
II:  Non-conformist regarding marriage and family
III:  More "youthful" deviations regarding civil morality and distrust in institutions, lack of child orientation, low social
    involvement
IV:  Self-actualization through expressive work values, tolerant toward ethnic minorities or deviant groups
V:  Oriented toward companionship and social status, distrusting social environment
VI: Egalitarian and anti-authoritarian, "post-materialist", stressing expressive socialization, "adult" forms of
    civil morality deviations acceptableDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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Chart 6.3: Correspondence between household positions and 80 non-conformist
value items, EVS 1999, results for West-3 (pooled samples)
I: Atheist and secular, activist
II:  Non-conformist regarding marriage and family
III:  More "youthful" deviations regarding civil morality and distrust in institutions, lack of child orientation, low social
    involvement
IV:  Self-actualization through expressive work values, tolerant toward ethnic minorities or deviant groups
V:  Oriented toward companionship and social status, distrusting social environment
VI: Egalitarian and anti-authoritarian, "post-materialist", stressing expressive socialization, "adult" forms of
    civil morality deviations acceptableDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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Chart 6.4:  Correspondence between household positions and 80 non-conformist
value items, EVS 1999, results for Iberia-2 (pooled samples)
I: Atheist and secular, activist
II:  Non-conformist regarding marriage and family
III:  More "youthful" deviations regarding civil morality and distrust in institutions, lack of child orientation, low social
    involvement
IV:  Self-actualization through expressive work values, tolerant toward ethnic minorities or deviant groups
V:  Oriented toward companionship and social status, distrusting social environment
VI: Egalitarian and anti-authoritarian, "post-materialist", stressing expressive socialization, "adult" forms of
    civil morality deviations acceptableDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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We shall now turn to the more detailed comparison of the outcomes for the three groups
of countries. These results are shown in Charts 6.2 through 6.4, respectively for
Scandinavia-2, West-3 and Iberia-2. The main differences between these regions can be
summarised as follows:
1.  Respar. We have already stressed that the respondents residing in the parental
home in Sweden and Denmark stand out by their overall low non-conformity
score when compared to their counterparts in the other two regions (cf. the
“left over” hypothesis). Chart 6.2 now indicates that the fewer non-conformist
items in the Scandinavian group belong to segment II, i.e. to non-conformist
attitudes with respect to marriage and the family. Residents in the parental
household in the other two regions have much higher overall non-conformist
scores, and these Respar-groups are located much more closely to the origin as
a consequence. Compared to their Scandinavian counterparts, they have a
stronger preference for the items in segments I and VI. In other words,
residents in parental households in the western European and Iberian countries
are much more secularised and more oriented to egalitarian and anti-
authoritarian value orientations.
2.  Single. In all three regions, respondents living alone show a relative surplus on
the overall non-conformist scale (red upwardly pointing arrows). They have a
preference for the value-items in segment II in West-3 and Iberia-2, and for
those in adjacent segment III in Scandinavia-2. It comes as no surprise that
singles are non-conformist regarding marriage and family, have a lower
interest in children, have secular ethics, or entertain the more “youthful” forms
of weaker civil morality and distrust in institutions. More surprising is that
Scandinavian singles score so low on social involvement (i.e. never discuss
politics, no voluntary work).
3.  Coh0. From the previous section we also know that childless cohabitants
systematically have the highest overall non-conformist score of all household
positions, and that this holds in all groups of countries. The Scandinavian
Coh0-group is again slightly different from their counterparts in the other two
regions. The former has a more distinct preference for the items in segment II
(non-conformist regarding marriage and family), whereas the latter have a
profile that favours the items of segment I (atheist or non-religious, social
activist).
4.  Coh+. Cohabitants with children still have a relative surplus (red arrows) on
the non-conformist tally in the three regions, but the regional profiles are more
distinct. In the Scandinavian countries, cohabitants who have progressed to
parenthood are located closer to the items of segment VI, and stress egalitarianDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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partnership in tandem with being “post-materialist”. They strongly endorse
expressive socialisation traits, and tolerance for minorities or for groups with
deviant behaviours. The Iberian cohabiting parents – who are of course less
common – have profiles that are diametrically at the opposite side of the
projection circle. They have a stronger preference for the items in segment III,
i.e. for the more “youthful” forms of distrust in institutions and deviations
regarding civil morality. The profile for West-3 is again distinct from the
others, and shows a preference for items in segment II. In other words, the
Coh+ group, in the three Western European countries seem to maintain their
initial non-conformist characteristics that are associated with selection into
cohabitation in the first place (i.e. non-conformist regarding marriage and
family). Moreover, in West-3 the positions of Respar, Single, Coh0 and Coh+
are all located very closely together on the projection plane in Chart 6.2,
meaning that they have very similar value preferences (those of segments I and
II). In Iberia-2, this also holds for the first three household types, but not for
Coh+ which is clearly located in segment III. In the Scandinavian countries the
value profiles of these four household positions are more strongly
differentiated and spread over segments II, III and VI. Scandinavian cohabiting
parents are furthermore much more comparable in their value orientations to
married individuals than in the other countries.
5.  Mar0. Childless married persons in the two Scandinavian countries are again
somewhat different in their value preferences compared to their counterparts of
West-3 and Iberia-2. Firstly, the Scandinavians still have a relative surplus on
the overall non-conformist tally, and secondly they are firmly located in
segment VI (egalitarian partnership, anti-authoritarian, expressive
socialisation). In the other regions a different selection process seems to be
operating: the Mar0 category has a much more conformist outlook (cf. the
relative deficit on the overall non-conformist scale) and this group mainly
subscribes to a different package of non-conformist items as well. More
specifically, the smaller number of non-conformist items for Mar0 is located
disproportionately in segment IV, which mainly corresponds to self-
actualisation via stressing the expressive work qualities.
6.  Mar+N.  As indicated in the previous section, married parents who never
cohabited before are by all means the most conformist group. They have by far
the largest relative deficit of non-conformist items in all three groups of
countries (largest downward pointing blue arrows in Charts 6.2 through 6.4).
Their value profiles are not very dissimilar either in the three regions. The
small set of non-conformist items acceptable to never cohabiting married
parents belong to segments IV or V: expressive work values, work withDemographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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prestige and responsibility, and stress on companionship in marriage. There is
an aversion to the items of segments I and II, which are at the opposite end of
the projection plane.
7.  Mar+E. We have also pointed out in the previous section that married parents
with an earlier cohabitation experience (i.e. ever cohabited) have retained a
more overall non-conformist outlook than those without such an experience
(i.e. Mar+N). In terms of the more specific value profiles, the difference
between these two groups is small in the two Scandinavian countries (see
Chart 6.2), probably because of the routinisation of cohabitation. In these
countries both groups of married parents are also located in segment V. In
West-3 and Iberia-2, however, these two household types are much further
apart (see Chart 6.2 and especially Chart 6.3): the Mar+E group is always
much closer to segment VI with its large clusters of items related to anti-
authoritarianism and equality. In other words, in the Western European and
Iberian countries, the earlier experience of cohabitation not only leads to less
conservatism and less conformist in general, but particularly to a lasting
aversion for inequality and authority as well. Expressed in more classic
political science terminology, the Mar+E group has retained more “new left”
and more “post-materialist” traits in Western Europe and Iberia.
8.  FmNu. As expected, the group of respondents who are currently divorced or
separated, but who are not yet in a new union, have a return of their value
profiles in the direction of segment VI and away from segments IV and V
(typically for the married persons). In other words, they return to stressing
egalitarian and anti-authoritarian values. In the Scandinavian countries, they
do so to a remarkable degree and this is coupled to more secularisation as well
(see the proximity of segment I). However, the other aspects of non-
conformity are stressed less by the Swedish and Danish respondents. The
Western European and the Iberian FmNu categories again resemble all those
who are not yet married, and they return to much higher overall, but less
differentiated, non-conformist scores.
On the whole, the inspection of the more detailed value profiles of the various
household types in the three groups of countries reveals a strong similarity between
West-3 and Iberia-2.  It seems that the Spanish and Portuguese are largely following
similar selection and adjustment paths during the SDT as the Belgians, French or
Germans. The Danish and Swedish profiles are more idiosyncratic in their details. For
instance, the effect of the secularisation factor in the pooled Scandinavian sample is less
important than in the other two regional groups. We hypothesize that such regional
differences in the more precise nature of the “footprints” could be due, at least in part,Demographic Research – Special Collection 3: Article 3
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to historical features of cultural and social organisation, to timing differences in the
onset of the SDT, and to large differences in the incidence of the “new” household
types. Each of these factors could produce different selection and adjustment outcomes
(cf. the presumed “left behind” effect for the smaller Scandinavian Respar-group, or the
greater similarity between the Scandinavian Mar+N and Mar+E groups). However,
such finer explanatory hypotheses can definitely never be tested with cross-sectional
data of the sort used here, and for the time being the causes of these more idiosyncratic
profiles of the Scandinavia-2 set will remain a matter of speculation.
7. Conclusions
The new types of household formation via more prolonged single living, premarital
cohabitation, and progression to parenthood within cohabiting unions have steadily
gained ground in Europe. These features of the SDT initially appeared in Scandinavia
during the 1960s, spread to Western Europe in the 1970s, reached the Iberian
populations in the mid-1980s, and apparently expanded to central Europe as well during
the 1990s. For all regions listed above, we found a clear statistical association between
a variety of value orientations and household types, and this association persists after
controls for age, gender, education, profession and urbanity. The patterning of the value
profiles according to household types is quite similar in the various regions of Europe.
To bring this out more clearly, we have added the profiles of a group of central and a
group of Eastern European countries to those of the three regions used here. This
overall picture is shown in Chart 7.1. From this enlarged set of value profiles we can
draw a number of conclusions.
1. There is a set of features that is present in all country groups studied so far.
Firstly, childless cohabitants typically have the most pronounced non-conformist
orientation in the various value sets pertaining to secularisation, ethics, civil
morality, egalitarianism, anti-authoritarianism, expressive values in work and
socialisation, tolerance, world orientation etc. Secondly, married parents who
never cohabited are always at the other end of the spectrum with the lowest non-
conformist score of all. Thirdly, married parents who ever cohabited are always
more non-conformist than their counterparts who never cohabited. This suggests
that the earlier cohabitation experience have a lasting effect operating in the non-
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2. There are also several features, which are not found in all regions, but that are
still very common. For instance, single living is also associated with very high
non-conformist across a wide variety of dimensions. And also, when compared to
married persons, divorcees and separated individuals who are not yet in a new
union seem to return to distinctly more non-conformist values or were selected in
this direction to start with.
Chart 7: Number of positive net deviations (=in non-conformist direction) for 80
items according to household position; 1999 EVS results for five groups
of European countries after controls for other covariates.
Note: Central-7 consists of the unweighted pooled EVS-samples of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland,
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The dynamics of the process that produces these differentials by household type
can obviously not be detected through a simple cross-sectional data set of the type used
here. The main advantage of the EVS is solely that this survey allows for the study of
such differentials for a large set of value items. If we want to study the dynamics
themselves, we have to turn to longitudinal studies, and there is a small collection of US
and Western European panel studies that have been of considerable help in shedding
light on what is happening. However, each of these panel-based analyses only deals
with either one or two very specific transitions and only focuses on a limited number of
value items. Nevertheless, two mechanisms emerge. Firstly, there is the self-selection of
individuals into particular household positions depending on, inter alia, the value
orientations that were held prior to the transition. This is the feature of values-based
selection and sorting. Secondly, there is the adjustment or reinforcement of existing
values depending on the particular type of household transition that has just been made.
This is the feature of the transition-based value adaptation. Together these two features
constitute the recursive model of selection and adaptation, and this model, although
operating over time, must result at one particular moment in a specific cross-sectional
profile of values for the various household types (see Section 4). These value profiles
by household type are referred to as the “footprints” of the selection-adaptation model.
The main conclusion of our investigation is that these “footprints” are found in all
the regions studied so far, and hence in the SDT-precursors as well as in the SDT-
newcomers. There are, however, complications that cause regional differences in the
more precise value profiles by household type. These stem from different historical
developments regarding culture and social organisation, the differences in the onset and
staging of the SDT, the differences in the dominant types of household transitions, and
from differences in the timing and speed of these transitions. The detection of the nature
and the causes of these differences are again far beyond the capacity of the present
analysis with cross-sectional data. Yet, despite such distortions, the present descriptive
results on overall non-conformism for the various regions are remarkably similar and
robust, and they lend further credence to the involvement of major ideational effects in
the unfolding of the SDT.
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30.  The excluded items were related to the “left-right” dimension in economic and
social policies (state and labour union interference versus free enterprise) and
economic equity, perceived causes of poverty, overall job satisfaction, political
items covering the functioning of democracy, and more detailed attitudes towards
elderly people and immigrants. Several items pertaining to female autonomy and
gender inequality also had to be excluded since they were not incorporated in all
the national questionnaires.
31.  For the philosophy and technical details, see Benzecri, J.-P., 1973. L’analyse des
données – L’analyse des correspondences. Dunod, Paris, and Greenacre, M., 1984.
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